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Analysing institutional liability for child sexual abuse in England and Wales and 
Australia: Vicarious liability, non-delegable duties and statutory intervention. 
 





This article will argue that a new approach is needed for dealing with claims for vicarious 
liability and non-delegable duties in the law of tort.  It will submit that lessons can be learnt 
from a comparative study of UK and Australian law, notably by reflecting on the courts’ recent 
treatment of claims of institutional liability for child sexual abuse in Various Claimants v 
Catholic Child Welfare Society1 and Armes v Nottinghamshire CC2 (UK Supreme Court) and 
in Prince Alfred College v ADC3 (High Court of Australia).  In all three claims it was alleged 
that institutions should be vicariously liable for the abuse in question and that the current 
requirements for vicarious liability should be applied more flexibly to meet the claimants’ 
demands for compensation.  Arguments based on non-delegable duties were either not pursued 
or rejected.  In revising once again the rules of vicarious liability, the courts in both jurisdictions 
have highlighted the tension which exists in private law between vicarious liability and non-
delegable duties and the question of their correct application in private law.  
 
This paper will also consider the possibility of statutory intervention.  Parallel to the activity 
of the courts dealing with claims of abuse in contexts varying from children’s homes and 
schools to foster care, public enquiries in England and Wales and Australia, established to 
report on historic cases of child sexual abuse, are now reporting their findings.  These include 
recommendations for changes to private law.  In England and Wales, the Independent Inquiry 
into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA) has, since 2014, been examining allegations of past and 
ongoing failures of institutions to protect children in schools, residential homes, secure 
accommodation and local authority care;4 the intention is to make “substantial progress by 
2020”.5    The IICSA is actively examining the civil litigation experience of victims of abuse 
and analysing data from the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority to understand what 
amounts are currently paid to victims of child sexual abuse.  While unlikely to report before 
2021, the IICSA is identifying problems arising from the civil litigation process in UK courts.  
The Australian Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (Royal 
Commission), established in 2013, has made greater progress.  In December 2017, it published 
the result of its five year investigation into how institutions such as schools, churches, sports 
clubs and government organisations in Australia have responded to allegations and instances 
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of child sexual abuse.6   Its 17 volume Final Report covers a broad range of inter-related issues 
including how to understand the nature, cause and impact of child sexual abuse in institutional 
contexts, how to support institutions to be child safe, how to treat children with harmful sexual 
behaviours and how the state can promote the need for advocacy, support and therapeutic 
treatment services.7  Significantly, both reports to date have highlighted the importance of risk 
management strategies which focus on preventing, identifying and mitigating risks to children.8  
The Final Report of the Royal Commission recommends the introduction of a national redress 
scheme which would make it easier for victims/survivors of child sexual abuse to obtain 
reparation for the abuse committed against them.  Similarly, the IICSA’s interim report of April 
2018 recommends a redress scheme for surviving child migrants.  The Commission’s separate 
Redress and Civil Litigation Report9 does, however, argue that any state-based redress scheme 
must be supplemented by changes to private law.  The option chosen by the Royal Commission 
is the introduction of a statutory non-delegable duty, supported by a reversed burden of proof 
for abuse victims.10   
 
This article will critically assess how private law has engaged with historic child sexual abuse 
claims committed by individuals employed or associated with the operations of institutions and 
the degree to which the approach adopted has destabilised core tort law principle.  While the 
inquiries have raised the possibility of state-based redress schemes, neither system has 
suggested that they should replace private law provision.  There seems no appetite, therefore, 
for a system based solely on social solidarity.  The question, then, is how private law should 
respond.  Intervention, as we will see, has focused primarily on institutional liability -  
institutions being the natural target for claims relating to historic abuse where the perpetrators 
are likely to have disappeared, passed away or, even if traceable, lack funds.  Three options 
exist: institutional negligence, vicarious (strict) liability for the torts of others, and a non-
delegable duty (statutory/common law) to protect victims against sexual abuse.  It will be 
argued that the UK’s approach, favouring the option of vicarious liability, has gone too far.  
This is particularly important given that the UK Supreme Court is now applying this approach, 
evolved to respond to cases of institutional child sexual abuse, to tort law generally including 
cases involving basic negligence and non-sexual intentional torts.11  In contrast, the Australian 
approach has been more cautious. While not without its own faults, notably an overly restrictive 
notion of the employment relationship, it will be argued that its more considered incremental 
approach is capable of providing a basis for greater certainty and coherence in this area of law.  
Fundamentally, this paper will argue that the current legal position in both jurisdictions is 
unsatisfactory and change is needed.  Claims of historic institutional child sexual abuse have 
challenged the ability of the law of tort to respond to social injustice.  In reacting, however, it 
is important not to forget the need to provide litigants with a law of tort which is coherent, 
principled and just.  In particular, this article will consider whether vicarious liability should, 
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as the English Court of Appeal remarked in July 2018, remain “on the move”12 or whether a 
more controlled, incremental approach is needed to respond to the extraordinary extension of 




II. WHY IS A PRIVATE LAW RESPONSE NEEDED FOR INSTITUTIONAL 
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE? 
 
Despite the existence of statutory redress schemes such as the UK Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Scheme (CICS) and the Australian Redress Scheme for survivors of institutional 
child sexual abuse, claimants continue to bring claims in private law for compensation arising 
from sexual abuse.  The limitations of the CICS are well known.13  While claims may be made 
up to a capped amount of £500,000 for injuries resulting from a criminal act, time limits exist14 
and other restrictions apply e.g. awards may be withheld or reduced because of the applicant’s 
character.15 A BBC investigation in 2015, based on a freedom of information request, found 
that compensation had been reduced for more than 400 sexual abuse victims in Britain who 
had subsequently committed criminal offences.16 The Government’s 2014 guide to the scheme 
also expressly advises that it is intended to be a matter of last resort: “Where the opportunity 
exists for you to pursue compensation elsewhere you should do so.”17  The Australian Scheme, 
which opened in July 2018 and will run for 10 years (with an option to extend), is also limited 
in scope.  While the Australian Government committed $33.4 million in the 2017-18 Budget 
to establish the Scheme,18 in its original form it was confined to survivors of child sexual abuse 
in Commonwealth institutional settings who were sexually abused before 1 July 2018.19   Other 
bodies could opt in and it was only after considerable deliberation that all states and territories, 
excluding Western Australia, ultimately signed up to the scheme – a late signature being the 
Catholic Church.20  Redress is capped (as is the norm in such schemes) with eligible survivors 
provided with redress in the form of a monetary payment of up to $150,000, with the 
                                                          
12 Barclays Bank Plc v Various Claimants [2018] EWCA Civ 1670, para.41 per Irwin L.J. 
13 See, generally, D. Miers, “Compensating Deserving Victims of Violent Crime: The Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Scheme” (2014) 34 L.S. 242.  
14 Claimants are expected to apply for compensation as soon as it is reasonably practicable for them to do so, 
normally not later than two years after the crime occurred. While special provision is made for abuse cases, 
Sugarman reports that the time limit for bringing applications continues to be a hurdle in cases involving historic 
sexual abuse: N. Sugarman, “The Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2012 and its Impact on Victims of 
Crime” [2016] JPI Law 231, 233. 
15  See Ministry of Justice, The Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2012 (London, HMSO, 2012), paras.25-
27. This is a real problem for victims of abuse whose suffering may have led them to seek solace in drugs or into 
other criminal activities.  See P. Lewis, Delayed Prosecution for Childhood Sexual Abuse (OUP, 2006) 24 who 
notes evidence that sexually abused children typically suffer from higher rates of serious medical, psychological, 
and social problems during adulthood than adults who were not abused as children. 
16 see www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33707529  (accessed 8 August 2018). See also Macleod, who comments on the 
use of blamelessness and behaviour as eligibility criteria: S. Macleod, “Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme” 
in S. Macleod and C. Hodges (eds), Redress Schemes for Personal Injuries (Hart Publishing, 2017) 508. 
17 CICA and Ministry of Justice, Criminal Injuries Compensation: A Guide (March 2014).  
18 The number of potential claimants in the 2015 Report was estimated at 60,000: (n 9) 33. 
19 This includes situations where the Commonwealth employed minors, delivered activities for children, delivered 
state functions in the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory before self-government, held children 
in detention or was a guardian.  In addition to this cut-off date, applicants must be born before 30 June 2010, an 
Australian citizen or permanent resident and not already received a court-ordered payment from the institution: 
https://www.nationalredress.gov.au/applying/who-can-apply (accessed 8 August 2018). 
20 See BBC News, “Catholic Church joins sex abuse compensation scheme” May 30 2018 
(https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-australia-44298275 accessed 8 August 2018).   
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opportunity to receive support through trauma-informed and culturally appropriate 
counselling.21  Such sums have been criticised for being considerably less than that provided, 
for example, by the Irish Redress Scheme22  which put a cap of €300,000 in place, which could 
be exceeded if the assessors felt this was appropriate.23  The cost of the Commonwealth redress 
scheme has been nevertheless estimated as between $570 million and $770 million over 10 
years. 
 
The limits on such schemes (notably in Australia excluding future victims of abuse) signifies 
that victims in both jurisdictions will continue to turn to private law to seek compensation for 
the abuse they have suffered.24  Indeed, Goudkamp and Plunkett have argued that public 
inquiries, in unearthing historic instances of abuse, render it more likely that such cases will 
come before the courts.25  Civil litigation, despite its stresses and costs, does offer an alternative 
means to obtain compensation, assessed, of course, at the more advantageous tortious basis. It 
should also not be dismissed as simply a money game.   In theory at least, a court hearing may 
provide claimants with a public forum in which the perpetrators of abuse and the institutions 
they view as indirectly responsible may be held to account.  The mechanism of the civil trial 
may also provide an outlet for the anger and frustration of victims, particularly in the face of 
denials of liability by defendants,26 and allow for a public dissection of the wrongful conduct.27  
While the realities of the litigation process often diminish the force of such arguments, notably 
the fact that most tort cases are settled before trial,28 an award of compensation, even if based 
on a settlement, is likely to have significance to a victim of abuse beyond the monetary.  As 
Case has observed: 
 
 … a compensation award does more than provide financial recompense for the economic disadvantages which 
abuse and psychiatric injury have inflicted, it also performs a subset of functions; damages have symbolic force 
as, inter alia, an expression of the wrong done to the claimant and a vindication of the claimant’s character.29 
 
For claimants suing in private law, institutional liability is most likely to provide the best source 
of compensation.  Any action against the perpetrator of the abuse faces the hurdle of having to 
trace any abuser who has not been identified by the police for criminal prosecution.  In many 
cases we know that the institution was sued because the abuser in question was dead or 
                                                          
21 If they wish, survivors will also have the opportunity to tell their personal story about their experience to a 
senior representative of the responsible agency, and to receive direct personal acknowledgement and response 
22 See http://www.rirb.ie/. The total awards made up to 31st December 2016 amount to €969.9m. The average 
value of award is €62,250, the largest award being €300,500: RIRB Annual Report (2016).  
23 $150,000 is also less than the $200,000 cap recommended by the Royal Commission in its 2015 Report (see (n 
9) recommendation 19). 
24 See S. Degeling and K. Barker, “Private Law and Grave Historical Injustice: The Role of the Common Law’”41 
Monash UL Rev 377 (2015)  395-397, who argue that such schemes can learn much from the common law. 
25 J. Goudkamp and J. Plunkett, “Vicarious liability in Australia: On the move?” (2017) 17 O.U.C.L.J. 162, 166. 
26 A. Simanowitz, “Accountability” in C. Vincent, M. Ennis and R.J. Audley eds., Medical Accidents (OUP, 1993), 
Ch. 14. 
27 See D. Priel, “A public role for the intentional torts” in K. Barker and D. Jensen (eds), Private Law: Key 
Encounters with Public Law (CUP, 2013). 
28 See R. Lewis, “Strategies and tactics in litigating personal injury claims: Tort law in action” [2018] JPI Law 
113. 
29 P. Case, Compensating Child Abuse in England and Wales (CUP, 2007) 37, who stresses the therapeutic and 
compensatory capacities of tort litigation for the abused claimant. 
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untraceable.30 Further, abusers even if traced may lack sufficient means to compensate.31  It is 
not, therefore, accidental that latent claims against abusers tend to be in the criminal courts 
rather than in the pursuit of a compensation claim the perpetrator is unlikely to be able to meet.  
Hall argues that given the cost of redress schemes, realistically they can only be seen as 
alternatives, not replacements, for legal actions.32  The question, then, is how private law 
responds.  As will be seen below, three options exist which will be examined in turn. 
 
 
III. THE OPTIONS: FAULT, VICARIOUS LIABILITY, NON-DELEGABLE 
DUTIES 
 
In view of the difficulties experienced by victims of child sexual abuse in bringing claims 
against the perpetrators of historic abuse outlined above, it is not surprising that both England 
and Wales and Australia have faced arguments of institutional liability based on fault, 
attributed fault (non-delegable duties) and strict liability (vicarious liability).  The choices made 
in each jurisdiction towards these options gives us an insight into private law legal development 
and the extent to which “difficult cases” of historic child sexual abuse have changed private 
law generally.  
 
 
A. Institutional fault 
 
Institutions may be found to be primarily liable where they have negligently failed to prevent 
the abuse taking place.  For example, where the institution knew or should have appreciated 
that the carer in question was incompetent or untrustworthy, the employer will liable unless 
special precautions were undertaken.33  Hoyano and Keenan identify four main sources of 
institutional liability in negligence: negligence in employing and continuing to employ staff 
whom the institution knew or should have known were paedophiles; failing to take reasonable 
steps to prevent or stop physical and sexual assaults; failing to exercise reasonable supervision 
and direction of employees; and failing to investigate abuse following reports by the victim.34  
They argue that, in practice, it will be far easier to establish foreseeability of the risk of abuse 
as a generalized risk arising from the institutional culture than in relation to a specific 
employee.35 A failure, then, to take reasonable steps to provide safeguards for vulnerable 
children or to train staff properly may be regarded as prima facie examples of institutional fault. 
                                                          
30  See, eg, JGE v English Province of Our Lady of Charity [2012] EWCA Civ 938, [2013] 1 Q.B. 722 (priest 
deceased); Maga v Trustees of the Portsmouth Roman Catholic Diocesan Trust [2010] EWCA Civ 256, [2010] 1 
W.L.R. 1441 (priest disappeared presumed deceased); A v Trustees of the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society 
[2015] EWHC 1722 (QB) (ministerial servant deceased). 
31 A good example may be found in the leading Irish case of O’ Keeffe v Hickey [2009] IESC 39.  Here, prior to 
the vicarious liability claim, the abuse victim had instituted civil assault proceedings against Hickey (the school 
principal who had abused her). She was awarded more than €300,000 in compensation, but, as the Irish Supreme 
Court noted in Hickey, she had been unable to recover much, if any, of the award from the now retired teacher.  
See C. O’ Mahony, “State Liability for Abuse in Primary Schools: Systemic Failure and O’ Keeffe v. Hickey” 
(2009) 28 Irish Educational Studies 315. 
32 M. Hall, “The liability of public authorities for the abuse of children in institutional care” (2000) 14 Int J Law 
Policy Family 281, 298. 
33 See D & F Estates Ltd v Church Commissioners for England [1989] A.C. 177, 209. Exceptionally an employer 
may also be found to be directly liable where the tortfeasor is the mind and will of the institution so that it can be 
said the acts of the abuser are the acts of the institution itself (doctrine of attribution): Erlich v Leifer [2015] VSC 
499, para.91 per Rush J. 
34 L. Hoyano and C. Keenan, Child Abuse (OUP, 2007) 286-298. 
35 Ibid., 283. 
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Further, evidence of a continued practice of turning a blind-eye to credible claims of sexual 
abuse (if proven) could establish a basis for an institutional negligence claim.36  Morgan has 
argued that the advantage of such liability is that it calls systems and higher officials to account 
and may also play a forensic role in satisfying the victim’s need for accountability.37  
 
The issue, however, is one of proving fault.  Negligence requires the court to judge the conduct 
of the institution by the standards which prevailed at the time of the tort and not those applied 
today.38  McLachlin C.J., for example, in abuse case Blackwater v Plint39 commented that “by 
contemporary standards, the measures taken were clearly inadequate and the environment 
unsafe.  But by the standards of the time, constructive knowledge of a foreseeable risk of sexual 
assault to the children was not established.”  In that case, even though the children had made 
complaints to adults, the adults were not found to be negligent in failing to identify sexual 
abuse which would have been regarded as an almost unthinkable idea at the time.40  A similar 
finding was reached in the recent decision of the High Court of Australia in Prince Alfred 
College v ADC.41  While rumours had existed in relation to the housemaster, no concrete 
allegations had been made prior to the accusation in question.  The immediate dismissal of the 
housemaster when allegations were made was deemed by the lower court to indicate that the 
school had been unaware of the abuse.42  By the standards of 1962, the school was not at fault.  
 
In the absence, then, of clear evidence (or a concession by the defendant) that a reasonable 
employer would have identified the paedophile as a potential abuser, liability will be difficult 
to establish.  The Australian Royal Commission further identified that defendants, often at the 
instigation of their insurers, have responded to claims by hiring aggressive litigation lawyers 
making the plaintiffs fight every step of the way to establish proof of fault.  This includes 
charitable and religious organisations such as the Catholic church.43  Combined with the 
historic nature of such claims raising problems of lost evidence, faded memories, missing 
witnesses with records lost, mislaid or destroyed44 it can be very difficult for claimants to 
establish liability based on fault.   
 
Limitation is an associated problem.  For very good reasons, including suppressed memories 
and the impact of childhood trauma, child sexual abuse claims are generally brought many 
years after the event.  The Royal Commission noted that some victims take up to 22 years to 
speak publicly about the abuse they have suffered.45  Bearing in mind the powerlessness of 
victims of institutional child sexual abuse, this is not surprising, but this obviously renders it 
                                                          
36 See, for example, SB v NSW [2004] VSC 514; S v The Corporation of the Synod of the Diocese of Brisbane 
[2001] QSC 473. It remains unclear to what extent there is also a common law duty to report abuse to the police 
once the institution is made aware of its existence: see New South Wales v DC [2017] HCA 22. 
37 P. Morgan, “Distorting vicarious liability” (2011) 74 MLR 932, 945. 
38 See Roe v Minister of Health [1954] 2 Q.B. 66, 84. 
39 [2005] SCC 58, para 15 (emphasis added). 
40 Ibid., paras 14-15. 
41 [2016] HCA 37, (2016) 258 C.L.R. 134 
42 A, DC v Prince Alfred College Inc [2015] SASC 12, para.146 per Vanstone J.  
43 See the work of Tony Foley, “Institutional responses to child sexual abuse: how a moral conversation with its 
lawyers might contribute to cultural change in a faith-based institution” (2015) 18 Legal Ethics 164, Vivien 
Holmes, “Compounding the Abuse: Lawyers for the Catholic Church in the Ellis Case” (2014) 17 Legal Ethics 
433 and (in the US context) T.D. Lytton, Holding Bishops Accountable (HUP, 2008). 
44 In the recent vicarious liability case of Barclays Bank Plc v Various Claimants [2018] EWCA Civ 1670, for 
example, following the death of the alleged abuser in 2009, his son and daughter had cleared all his old paperwork 
from the family home and destroyed it. 
45 Royal Commission, Interim report Vol 1: What we are learning about responding to child sexual abuse (2014) 
Ch 5, 158.   
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more difficult for adult victims to bring claims.  While the UK courts finally accepted that the 
s.33 Limitation Act 1980 discretion to disapply the limitation period for personal injury claims 
could apply to sexual abuse46 (overturning earlier House of Lords authority in the process),47  
other jurisdictions (notably Australia) have not followed suit.48  This does not mean that the 
discretion will always be exercised in the claimant’s favour,49 but at least the claimant is given 
the opportunity to argue their case. The Australian Royal Commission in its 2015 Redress and 
Civil Litigation Report50 made it clear that the limitation periods in place at that time were 
inappropriate given the length of time that many survivors of child sexual abuse take to disclose 
their abuse.  It recommended, therefore, that the limitation period for commencing civil 
litigation for personal injury related to child sexual abuse should be removed and that the 
removal should be retrospective in operation.51  There has been a positive response to this 
recommendation.  The majority of states and territories including Queensland52 and New South 
Wales53 have removed (retrospectively) the limitation period entirely for victims of abuse 
(subject to a right of the court to stay proceedings where it would be unfair to the defendant to 
proceed).54 It is to be hoped that this recommendation will be implemented across all the states 
and territories of Australia. 
 
Yet, while the obstacle of limitation periods may, subject to the exercise of judicial discretion, 
be overcome, that of proving the fault of the institution on the balance of probabilities has not. 
It is on this basis that both jurisdictions have faced claims that further intervention is needed 
which is not dependent on proof of fault.  This leaves two options: vicarious liability and non-
delegable duties.  The motivation to act is clear.  In the words of Lord Hope: “Child sexual 
abuse is an ugly phenomenon. There is a heavy responsibility on our legal system to deal as 
fairly and justly as it can with the consequences.”55  The devil lies, however, in the detail: on 
what basis, legally, can compensation in the absence of proof of fault be justified?  When will 
the imposition of tortious liability be “fair and just”? 
 
B. Vicarious liability 
 
                                                          
46 A v Hoare [2008] UKHL 6; [2008] 1 A.C. 844. See F. Burton, “Limitation, vicarious liability and historic 
actions for abuse: a changing legal landscape” [2013] JPI Law 95. 
47 Stubbings v Webb [1993] A.C. 498. 
48 See Trustees of Roman Catholic Church v Ellis (2007) 70 NSWLR 565,  [2007] NSWCA 117.  For a 
comparative discussion, see A. Gray, “Extending time limits in sexual abuse cases: A critical comparative 
evaluation” (2009) 38 C.L.W.R. 342 
49 See A. Inglis, “Institutional child abuse: Limitation after A v Hoare” [2009] JPI Law 284. 
50 (n 9). Prior to the proposed changes, a child only had until they turned 21 years of age (in most cases) to make 
a claim for damages for personal injury as a result of sexual abuse. See also B. Mathews, “Limitation periods and 
child sexual abuse cases: Law, psychology, time and justice” (2003) 11 T.L.J. 218, 221 who argued that the 
statutory time limits put adult survivors of abuse in an invidious position where most would be incapable of 
bringing their action within the time set. 
51 Ibid., 52-53; recommendations 85-88. This will be subject to the need for a claimant to prove his or her case on 
admissible evidence and the court’s power to stay proceedings in the event that a fair trial is not possible.  
52 Limitation of Action Act 1974 (Qld) section 11A, as amended by the Limitation of Actions (Child Sexual 
Abuse) and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2016.   
53 Limitation Act 1969 (NSW), s.6A, as amended by Limitation Amendment (Child Abuse) Act 2016 (NSW).  
See also Limitation of Actions Amendment (Child Abuse) Act 2015 (Vict), Justice and Community Safety 
Legislation Amendment Act 2016 (No 2) (ACT), the Limitation Amendment (Child Abuse) Act 2017 (NT) and 
Civil Liability Legislation Amendment (Child Sexual Abuse Actions) Act 2018 (WA). 
54 See, for example, Limitation of Action Act 1974 (Qld), s.11A(5) and Limitation Act 1969 (NSW), s.6A(6).  
55 Lord Hope, “Tailoring the law on vicarious liability’ (2013) 129 L.Q.R. 514, 525. See also former UK Supreme 
Court justice, Lord Phillips, “Vicarious Liability on the Move” (2015) 45 H.K.L.J. 29. 
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The advantages of vicarious liability for claimants are self-evident.  An institution (which will 
usually be insured and/or with means) will be held strictly liable for the torts of others.  It is 
not without limitation, however.  Under the traditional formulation stated by Sir John Salmond 
in 1907, which was adopted across the common law world, a master would only be held 
responsible for a wrongful act done by his servant in the course of his employment: “It is 
deemed to be so done if it is either (1) a wrongful act authorised by his master, or (2) a wrongful 
and unauthorised mode of doing some act authorised by the master”.56  The UK House of Lords 
in Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd57 recognised immediately that such a formulation was ill-suited to 
claims for historic child sexual abuse.  However, rather than rejecting such a claim,58 the House 
accepted that sexual abuse could be regarded as “in the course of employment” of a carer where 
the torts of the abuser could be said to be so closely connected with his employment that it 
would be fair and just to hold the employers vicariously liable.59  This was extended in turn by 
the Supreme Court in Mohamud v WM Morrison Supermarkets plc60 where the UK Supreme 
Court provided a simplified version of the test. The courts should now focus on two questions 
to be approached broadly:61 
 
i. What functions or field of activities had been entrusted by the employer to the employee 
(or, in everyday language, what was the nature of the employee's job)? and 
ii. Was there a sufficient connection between the position in which the employee is 
employed and his wrongful conduct which would make it “right” for the employer to 
be held liable as a matter of social justice? 
 
The Supreme Court, perhaps surprisingly, was prepared to accept that a racist attack on a 
customer by a shop worker was sufficiently within the broad field of the activities entrusted to 
the employee to satisfy the “course of employment” test.  Khan had been employed to attend 
to customers and respond to their enquiries.  His violent assault was characterised simply as a 
foul mouthed and violent means of undertaking the “field of activities” assigned to him. 
 
A more flexible approach to the doctrine of vicarious liability, which includes intentional torts 
within the field of activities of the perpetrator, has also been extended to the relationship which 
gives rise to vicarious liability.  In the leading case of Various Claimants v Catholic Child 
Welfare Society (CCWS),62  the UK Supreme Court undertook a fundamental reframing of 
vicarious liability to produce “a modern theory of vicarious liability”.63   Vicarious liability 
would arise where a claimant could establish: 
 
Stage one: a relationship between D1 and D2 capable of giving rise to vicarious liability; and  
Stage two: a close connection that links the relationship between D1 and D2 and the act or 
omission of D1. 
 
In CCWS, the Supreme Court approved earlier authority that the stage one relationship would 
extend beyond the traditional contract of employment to include relationships “akin to 
                                                          
56 J. Salmond, The Law of Torts (1st ed, Stevens and Haynes 1907) 83 (later found in R. Heuston and R. Buckley, 
Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Tort (21st ed, Sweet and Maxwell 1996) 443). 
57 [2001] UKHL 22; [2002] 1 A.C. 215. 
58 See Trotman v North Yorkshire CC [1999] L.G.R. 584. 
59 Lister (n 57) para.28 (Lord Steyn).  
60 [2016] UKSC 11, [2016] A.C. 677.  
61 Mohamud ibid., paras.44-45 per Lord Toulson. 
62 [2012] UKSC 56, [2013] 2 A.C. 1. 
63 See Lord Reed in Cox v Ministry of Justice [2016] UKSC 10, [2016] A.C. 660 para.24. 
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employment”.64  This was taken further in later Supreme Court decisions to include a prisoner 
working in a prison kitchen (Cox v Ministry of Justice)65 and foster parent caring for children 
on behalf of a local authority (Armes v Nottinghamshire CC).66  The key issue is now whether 
the individual tortfeasor “carries on activities as an integral part of the business activities 
carried on by a defendant and for its benefit.”67  English law thus acknowledges that the 
relationship giving rise to vicarious liability will not always comply with the traditional 
employer/employee relationship.  It does mean, however, that the parameters of this 
relationship are far from fixed. There can no longer be said to be a “bright line” between 
employees and independent contractors for whom, traditionally, vicarious liability does not 
apply.68 
 
We can see that such developments render vicarious liability a very useful means by which 
victims of historic child sexual abuse can obtain compensation from (insured) institutional 
bodies without having to establish institutional fault.  Obstacles such as establishing an 
“authorised act” or “employment relationship” (note, for example, that priests are not 
employees but office-holders) are removed by the courts and thereby facilitate claims.  Further, 
the Supreme Court in CCWS identified five key criteria which would justify any extension of 
liability:  
 
(i) the employer is more likely to have the means to compensate the victim than the 
employee and can be expected to have insured against that liability; 
(ii) the tort will have been committed as a result of activity being taken by the employee 
on behalf of the employer;  
(iii) the employee’s activity is likely to be part of the business activity of the employer;  
(iv) the employer, by employing the employee to carry on the activity will have created 
the risk of the tort committed by the employee; and  
(v) the employee will, to a greater or lesser degree, have been under the control of the 
employee.69   
 
While the Court in Cox focussed on arguments based on enterprise liability, risk creation and 
delegation of task and Lord Toulson in Mohamud relied on “social justice”, Lord Reed in 
Armes argued that the weight to be attached to the CCWS criteria will vary according to the 
context.70  In Armes itself, the majority highlighted, for example, that the absence or 
unavailability of insurance, or some other means of meeting a potential liability, and the 
significant degree of control which local authorities exercised over what foster parents did and 
how they did it, were relevant considerations in determining whether a local authority should 
be vicariously liable for abuse to children whom it had entrusted to foster carers.71   
 
What we see is that the basis for the modern theory of vicarious liability is primarily one of 
risk management with institutions internalising the risk of abuse which is inherent in hiring 
workers to care for vulnerable children.  Such reasoning notably overlaps with the focus of the 
                                                          
64 See JGE v English Province of Our Lady of Charity [2012] EWCA Civ 938, [2013] Q.B. 722. It also extends 
to ministerial servants: A v The Trustees of the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society and others [2015] EWHC 
1722 (QB).   
65 [2016] UKSC 10. 
66 [2017] UKSC 60. 
67 Cox (n 65), para.24 per Lord Reed. 
68 Barclays Bank Plc v Various Claimants [2018] EWCA Civ 1670, para.61 per Irwin L.J. 
69 CCWS (n 62), para.35 (Lord Phillips).  
70 [2017] UKSC 60, para.63. 
71 Ibid., paras.62 and 63. 
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public inquiries discussed above.  We may also observe that the CCWS criteria are now being 
applied beyond abuse claims to those involving negligence (Cox) and non-sexual intentional 
torts (Mohamud).72  The implications for tort law more generally will be examined in Section 
IV below.  For the moment, it is worth noting that UK law has developed a broad doctrine of 
vicarious liability, inspired by its fellow common law jurisdiction, Canada,73 which places on 
the institution/enterprise responsibility for the risks associated with its activities.  Deakin has 
noted that nevertheless English judges have been hesitant to adopt a purely “enterprise risk” 
approach.74 This is true, but at the very least we can say that enterprise liability has been a 
driving force to extend the doctrine to cover the inherent risks of child sexual abuse.   
 
Australia, however, highlights that such reasoning is not a given.  In its leading cases of New 
South Wales v Lepore75 and Prince Alfred College v ADC,76 the High Court of Australia has 
demonstrated an overt reluctance to accept the case for enterprise liability reasoning and hence 
rejected the option to follow the approach of the UK and Canadian courts. The doctrine remains 
confined to employees.77  While Australia has accepted, in common with England and Wales,78 
that the governing test for the employment relationship can no longer be simply that of control, 
but one of the “totality of the relationship”,79 and, in Hollis v Vabu,80  adopted a generous 
interpretation of this test to find that a motorcycle courier, who negligently injured Hollis while 
making a delivery, was an employee for whom the company (whose uniform he wore) was 
vicariously liable, nevertheless, the “akin to employment” test has not been followed.  The 
similar idea of a “representative agent”, put forward in cases such as Hollis by McHugh J81 and 
which would have extended vicarious liability to some independent contractors, has been 
rejected by the High Court.82  Indeed, Leeming J.A. in Day v The Ocean Beach Hotel 
Shellharbour Pty Ltd noted that, until the High Court determines otherwise, the distinction 
between independent contractors and employees is a basic proposition central to the law 
relating to vicarious liability, which is “too deeply rooted to be pulled out”.83 In Trustees of 
Roman Catholic Church v Ellis,84 therefore, where the plaintiff had been sexually abused by 
an assistant priest while he had been an altar server at a parish of the Roman Catholic 
Archdiocese of Sydney, the Court held that: 
 
The law has proceeded by halting steps, identifying categories that do (e.g. employment) and do not (e.g. 
independent contractors) attract vicarious liability … The relationship between an assistant parish priest and 
                                                          
72 See P. Giliker, “Vicarious liability in the Supreme Court” (2017) 7 UK Supreme Court Yearbook 152; D. Ryan, 
“Close connection and akin to employment: Perspectives on fifty years of radical developments in vicarious 
liability” (2016) 56 Irish Jurist 239.  
73 See John Doe v Bennett [2004] 1 SCR 436 (relationship test) and Bazley v Curry [1999] 2 SCR 534 (course of 
employment test).  
74 S. Deakin, “The evolution of vicarious liability”, Allen & Overy Annual Lecture, University of Cambridge, 8 
November 2017, 8. 
75 [2003] HCA 4, (2003) 212 C.L.R. 511. 
76 [2016] HCA 37, (2016) 258 C.L.R. 134. 
77 See H. Luntz et al, Torts: Cases and Commentary (8th ed., LexisNexis, 2017) 17.1.3. 
78 Market Investigations v Minister of Social Security [1969] 2 Q.B. 173, 185 per Cooke J. 
79 Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling (1986) 160 C.L.R. 16, 29 per Mason J.  See also 671122 Ontario Ltd v Sagaz 
Industries Canada Inc [2001] SCR 983, 204 DLR (4th) 542, para.47 per Major J for the position in Canada. 
80 [2001] HCA 44, (2001) 207 C.L.R. 21. 
81 Hollis ibid., para.93.  See also Scott v Davis [2000] HCA 52, para.34.   
82 Sweeney v Boylan Nominees Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 19, (2006) 226 C.L.R. 161.  See also Scott v Davis [2000] 
HCA 52, (2000) 204 C.L.R. 333. 
83 [2013] NSWCA 250, (2013) 85 NSWLR 335, para.14, quoting Sweeney v Boylan Nominees Pty Ltd [2006] 
HCA 19, (2006) 226 C.L.R. 161, para.12 and para.33. 
84 (2007) 70 NSWLR 565, [2007] NSWCA 117.   
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the ‘members’ [of the church] as a whole is too slender and diffuse to establish agency in contract or vicarious 
liability in tort.85 
 
As Tan has commented, the “akin to employment” test has been instrumental in overcoming 
church reliance on the defence that abusive priests are office-holders, not employees. 86   This 
“technical” defence continues to exist in Australia. 
 
The High Court in Prince Alfred College v ADC87 also refused to follow the Mohamud 
approach to course of employment.  In its view, Khan’s conduct was not relevantly connected 
with his employment.88 While the case in Prince Alfred failed in any event under the Limitation 
of Actions Act 1936 (SA), the High Court nevertheless provided “seriously considered dicta”89 
to guide the lower courts.  This was badly needed in the light of the failure of the majority in 
Lepore to agree on what should be the test for course of employment in relation to intentional 
torts.90  The case itself involved the all too familiar case of institutional child sexual abuse.  The 
plaintiff had been sexually abused by a master (Bain) in 1962 while a 12-year-old boarder at 
the defendant school.  While the High Court refused to review its earlier decision in Lepore 
that the school’s non-delegable duty of care to its pupils would not extend to intentional torts, 
it did examine the question whether, in the absence of limitation arguments, vicarious liability 
could have assisted the plaintiff.  There was no problem in establishing a relationship of 
employment, so the sole issue before the court was whether the abuse was in the course of 
employment, bearing in mind that Bain was a housemaster with responsibilities over the 
dormitories in which the boys slept.   
 
In rejecting the position of the UK and Canadian courts as being too reliant on general principle 
and policy choices, the High Court advised that courts should focus on the role given to the 
employee and the nature of his responsibilities to establish whether his employment was the 
“occasion” for the commission of the wrongful act:  
 
 … in cases of this kind, the relevant approach is to consider any special role that the employer has assigned to 
the employee and the position in which the employee is thereby placed vis-à-vis the victim. In determining 
whether the apparent performance of such a role may be said to give the “occasion” for the wrongful act, particular 
features may be taken into account. They include authority, power, trust, control and the ability to achieve intimacy 
with the victim … Where, in such circumstances, the employee takes advantage of his or her position with respect 
to the victim, that may suffice to determine that the wrongful act should be regarded as committed in the course 
or scope of employment and as such render the employer vicariously liable. 91 
 
                                                          
85 Ibid., paras.53-54 per Mason P.  Technically, however, the NSW Court of Appeal left the question open whether 
a priest could be an employee (para.32). 
86 D. Tan, “A sufficiently close relationship akin to employment” (2013) 129 L.Q.R. 30, 34. 
87 [2016] HCA 37, (2016) 258 C.L.R. 134 
88 Ibid., para.80. 
89 Following the HCA’s decision in Farah Constructions v Say-Dee [2007] HCA 22; (2007) 230 C.L.R. 89, lower 
courts will be bound by “seriously considered dicta” of the High Court: see paras.134, 158. For criticism, see M. 
Harding and I. Malkin, “The High Court of Australia's Obiter Dicta and Decision-Making in Lower Courts” (2012) 
34 Syd L. Rev. 239. 
90 Subsequent case-law had struggled to apply Lepore in the absence of a clear ratio and had been criticised by 
commentators for failing to provide a single test capable of determining the course of employment in the sexual 
abuse context: see, eg, J.  Wangmann, “Liability for institutional child sexual assault: Where does Lepore leave 
Australia?” (2004) 28 Melb U L Rev 169 and P. Vines, “Schools’ responsibility for teachers’ sexual assault: Non-
delegable duty and vicarious liability” (2003) 27 Melb UL Rev 612. For the struggles of the Australian courts, see 
Ffrench v Sestili [2006] SASC 44; Sprod v Public Relations Orientated Security Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 319; Blake v J 
R Perry Nominees Pty Ltd [2012] VSCA 122; Withyman v NSW [2013] NSWCA 10. 
91 See (n 87), para.81. 
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In specifying a test of “occasion”, the High Court went back to basics: its 1949 decision in 
Deatons v Flew92  in which Dixon J. asked whether the intentional tort was one of those 
wrongful acts to which the ostensible performance of his employer’s work gave occasion.93 
Reference is made to specific features of the parties’ relationship: authority, power, trust, 
control and the ability to achieve intimacy with the victim.  This is a deliberately narrower 
formulation to that found in UK and Canadian law.  It is fact-specific and requires the plaintiff 
to identify a situation of power-disparity and vulnerability between him and his abuser.  There 
is an overt criticism of policy/enterprise risk driven expansion.  For the High Court, it was more 
appropriate to follow: 
 
 … the orthodox route of considering whether the approach taken in decided cases furnishes a solution to further 
cases as they arise. This has the advantage of consistency in what might, at some time in the future, develop into 
principle. And it has the advantage of being likely to identify factors which point toward liability and by that 
means provide explanation and guidance for future litigation.94 
 
While some commentators have queried whether any real difference can be found between the 
employment providing the “occasion” or “opportunity” for engaging in wrongdoing,95 the 
Australian courts now have the ability to construct a test which does distinguish between the 
two in a meaningful way. What is important is that the High Court is trying to signal a change 
in approach.  In rendering it easier for plaintiffs to rely on vicarious liability, it is seeking 
simultaneously to reduce the threat of over-extensive liability to which decisions like Mohamud 
give rise.  It does not attempt a “new” theory of vicarious liability, but places emphasis on 
incremental development, focussing on the facts of each case.   
 
We may ask why, in view of the different positions taken by other common law jurisdictions, 
such an approach was taken.  Is it natural conservativism or something deeper?  One possible 
answer derives from the emphasis that enterprise risk places on the relationship between 
insurance and vicarious liability.  McLachlin J. in Bazley v Curry put it succinctly: “the 
employer is often in the best position to spread the losses through mechanisms like insurance 
and higher prices, thus minimising the dislocative effect of the tort in society”.96  Australia, 
however, in the early 2000s experienced an insurance crisis, leading to a radical reappraisal of 
the role of tort law in society and the introduction of legislation limiting claims in tort in view 
of the fear that the award of damages for personal injury had become unaffordable and 
unsustainable as the principal source of compensation for those injured due to the fault of 
others.97  In this light, Goudkamp and Plunkett suggest that any proposal for a generous 
approach to civil liability would be treated with extreme caution: “[the] clear message [is] that 
an expansive law of torts is politically unacceptable”.98  Commentators have also noted in other 
                                                          
92 [1949] HCA 60. Deatons in turn was regarded as unjust and wrongly decided in Mohamud: [2016] UKSC 11, 
para.30.  
93 (n 87), para.81.   
94 See (n 87), para.46.  
95 See, for example, D. Ryan, “From opportunity to occasion: Vicarious liability in the High Court of Australia” 
[2017] C.L.J. 14, 17. Goudkamp and Plunkett argue that the analysis is overly focused on terminology at the 
expense of content and that a test of “authority, power, trust, control and the ability to achieve intimacy” is likely 
to make little sense in relation to negligence claims (n 25) 167. This is true, but it is not clear that the test would 
apply in this context. 
96 (1999) 174 DLR (4th) 45, 61. See also See S. Deakin, “Enterprise-risk: the juridical nature of the firm revisited” 
(2003) 32 I.L.J. 97 and D. Brodie, Enterprise Liability and the Common Law (CUP, 2010). 
97 Commonwealth of Australia, Review of the Law of Negligence: Final Report (Canberra, 2002).  See R. Davis, 
“The tort reform crisis” (2002) 25 UNSWLJ 865; P. Cane, “Reforming Tort Law in Australia: A Personal 
Perspective” (2003) 27 Melb U L Rev 649. 
98 Goudkamp and Plunkett (n 25) 168.  
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fields that the High Court has in recent years been less inclined to embark on the exercise of 
reshaping fundamental doctrine where innovation is deemed unnecessary to decide the case at 
hand.  On this basis, there is a “new sobriety” in the High Court.99  We may identify, however, 
a further reason: the doctrinal coherence of the law of tort.  In criticising Mohamud and 
adopting a cautious approach to the development of vicarious liability, the High Court is 
resisting the lure of compensation when it comes at the price of conceptual uncertainty.  In its 
earlier decision of Sweeney, it had expressed concern at the absence of any clear or stable 
principle underpinning the development of the doctrine of vicarious liability.100 There is a 
perceived need, therefore, for the courts to establish basic propositions on which the law could 
evolve.  Here “sobriety” reflects a distinct form of legal reasoning.  While the UK courts have 
been willing to intervene to assist claimants, finding a mechanism which enables them to do 
so, the High Court sees its role in developing legal principle, leaving overtly policy-based 
matters for the legislator.  
 
For the Australian Royal Commission, such reasoning, while understandable, continues to offer 
insufficient protection for victims of historic child sexual abuse.  Its solution was radical:  a 
statutory custom-made non-delegable duty owed by institutions (defined broadly) to vulnerable 
parties over which they exercise some level of control.  Such a proposal raises questions which 
many UK commentators are now asking: if vicarious liability is increasingly giving rise to fears 
of over-extensive liability, are non-delegable duties the answer?  In the next section, I will 
examine the possibility of using non-delegable duties, created by statute and/or at common 
law, to respond to child sexual abuse claims.   
 
 
C. Non-delegable duties (statutory/common law) 
 
Traditionally a non-delegable duty is one imposed directly on the defendant to ensure that 
reasonable care is taken.101  It is primary, not vicarious, liability and holds the institution 
personally liable to victims injured due to the torts of any employees or independent contractors 
to whom it has delegated its duty of care.102 As the UK Supreme Court commented in Armes:  
 
The expression thus refers to a higher standard of care than the ordinary duty of care. Duties involving this higher 
standard of care are described as non-delegable because they cannot be discharged merely by the exercise of 
reasonable care in the selection of a third party to whom the function in question is delegated … [Such duties] are 
exceptional, and have to be kept within reasonable limits.103  
 
Until recently, non-delegable duties were seen almost as an historical anachronism, dealing 
with a limited category of claims arising in particular contexts.  They would be found, thus, as 
an addendum to any discussion of vicarious liability or treated as confined to their specific 
context.104  Australia has, however, led the way in developing the concept of the modern non-
delegable duty, as acknowledged recently in the UK case of Woodland v Essex CC.105  In 
                                                          
99 M. Bryan, ‘Almost 25 years on: some reflections on Waltons v Maher’ (2012) 6 Journal of Equity 131 at 134. 
100 Sweeney v Boylan Nominees Pty Limited [2006] HCA 19, (2006) 226 C.L.R. 161, para.11. 
101 The Pass of Ballater [1942] P 112, 117 per Langton J. 
102 M.A. Jones (ed), Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (22nd edn, Sweet and Maxwell, 2017) para.6-60. 
103 Armes (n 66), paras.31-32. 
104 For example, employers’ liability (Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co Ltd v English [1938] A.C. 57) or the rule in 
Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330. 
105 [2013] UKSC 66, para.23 per Lord Sumption.  For a comparison of UK and Australian law, see N. Foster, 
“Convergence and divergence: The law of non-delegable duties in Australia and the United Kingdom” in A. 
Robertson and M. Tilbury, Divergences in Private Law (Hart, 2016) 119ff. 
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Kondis v State Transport Authority,106  Mason J. accepted that a non-delegable duty would 
arise: 
 
… because the person on whom it is imposed has undertaken the care, supervision or control of the person or 
property of another or is so placed in relation to that person or his property as to assume a particular responsibility 
for his or its safety, in circumstances where the person affected might reasonably expect that due care will be 
exercised.107 
 
The Kondis non-delegable duty is replicated to a certain extent by the UK Supreme Court in 
Woodland where Lord Sumption identified three critical characteristics: 
 
i. There is an antecedent relationship between the defendant and the claimant.  
ii. It imposes a positive or affirmative duty to protect a particular class of persons against 
a particular class of risks, and is not simply a duty to refrain from acting in a way that 
foreseeably causes injury.  
iii. The duty is by virtue of that relationship personal to the defendant.108 
 
On this basis, non-delegable duties have been found to arise in relation to institutions such as 
schools109 and day care centres110 and hospitals.111   
 
It is easy to see how the modern non-delegable duty might appeal in relation to institutional 
child sexual abuse cases.  The institution will be dealing with vulnerable parties to whom it is 
offering some form of care or protection.  As yet, however, neither legal system has extended 
the modern non-delegable duty to intentional torts.  This would require treating a duty “to 
ensure that reasonable care is taken” to cover both deliberate and negligent harm.  For Gleeson 
CJ in Lepore this is a step too far.  His concerns range from the potentially negative impact of 
such a duty on charitable and small organisations, which do not necessarily have the “deeper” 
pockets or insurance cover to meet such claims, to the absence of proof of deterrence when the 
sanctions imposed by criminal law have clearly not served to prevent the criminal actions of 
the tortfeasor.112  The Court of Appeal in Armes (NA) v Nottinghamshire CC113 also expressed 
concern at the burden such a duty might place on local authorities with a detrimental impact 
                                                          
106 [1984] HCA 61, (1984) 154 C.L.R. 672 (employers’ liability). 
107 Ibid., 687.  See also J. Murphy, “The Juridical Foundations of Common Law Non-Delegable Duties” in J. 
Neyers et al (eds), Emerging Issues in Tort Law (Hart, 2007); cf R. Stevens, “Non-Delegable Duties and Vicarious 
Liability” in the same text. See also Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd [1994] HCA 13, (1994) 179 
C.L.R. 520, 551: “the relationship of proximity giving rise to the non-delegable duty of care in such cases is 
marked by special dependence or vulnerability on the part of that person.”     
108 Woodland v Essex CC [2013] UKSC 66, para.7. Note, in particular, the five defining features identified by 
Lord Sumption: para.23. Lord Sumption noted also a second category of non-delegable duties which consists of 
a large, varied and anomalous class of cases involving inherently hazardous activities and dangers on the public 
highway.   
109 Woodland v Essex CC [2013] UKSC 66, but not in relation to the intentional torts of a teacher: New South 
Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 C.L.R. 511. 
110 Commonwealth v Introvigne [1982] HCA 40, (1982) 150 C.L.R. 258 per Mason J. paras.26-32 and per Murphy 
J, para.5; Woodland v Essex CC [2013] UKSC 66; Fitzgerald v Hill [2008] QCA 283. 
111 Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital [1980] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 542; Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 
C.L.R. 258, 270 per Mason J, with whom Gibbs CJ agreed; Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital (1989) 17 
N.S.W.L.R. 553.  Recent English case-law has extended this non-delegable duty to health care provision to 
detainees in an immigration centre: GB v Home Office [2015] EWHC 819 (QB) cf Razumas v MoJ [2018] EWHC 
215 (QB) which distinguished GB due to its different legislative backdrop. 
112 See Gleeson CJ (n 109) para.36.   
113 [2015] EWCA Civ 1139, [2016] 2 W.L.R. 1455.  
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on the best interests of children in care.  In Woodland itself, the duty was confined to negligence 
claims (although the issue of intentional torts did not arise).   
 
Questions have also been raised to what extent reliance can legitimately be placed on non-
delegable duties when they do not appear to be readily distinguishable from vicarious liability.  
For Lord Reed in Armes, such problems are exaggerated – there is a clear classificatory 
distinction between vicarious liability and non-delegable duties with the doctrines having 
different “incidents and rationales”.114  However, if we consider how both doctrines function, 
then both operate to render an institution, which is not guilty of institutional negligence, liable 
in tort for wrongs committed by another.  Fleming on this basis famously called non-delegable 
duties a “disguised form of vicarious liability”.115 Glanville Williams was also critical of the 
lack of conceptual unity between the different non-delegable duties with cases decided “on no 
rational grounds, but … whether the judge is attracted by the language of non-delegable 
duty.”116  Williams’ argument has been countered to some extent by Lord Sumption’s 
rationalisation in Woodland of a distinct category of non-delegable duty based on assumption 
of responsibility, but the Woodland non-delegable duty has not stopped academics such as 
Jonathan Morgan arguing that non-delegable duties remain functionally identical to vicarious 
liability and thus represent “nothing more than a sleight of hand to produce what is supposed 
to be impossible, namely vicarious liability for the torts of independent contractors.”117  While 
more positive, Beuermann also sees definitional problems and seeks to identify a more coherent 
underlying theory which she entitles “conferred authority strict liability”.118  The current 
functional overlap of vicarious liability and non-delegable duties, in her view, undermines any 
principled basis for strict liability for the wrongdoing of another in the law of tort.  Deakin has 
also conceded recently that “many issues remain to be clarified”.119   Non-delegable duties, at 
best, may be described as “under construction”. 
 
Nevertheless, the Australian Royal Commission in 2015 saw the introduction of a statutory 
non-delegable duty as the best means to deal with the problem of compensating victims of child 
sexual abuse. The UK Supreme Court in Armes also refused to rule out the possibility of 
extending common law non-delegable duties to intentional torts.  The merits of both these 
options will be examined below. 
 
(i) A statutory non-delegable duty 
 
A legislative response, it might be argued, has a number of advantages.  It can address 
definitional uncertainty by setting out clearly the nature and scope of a particular non-delegable 
duty and provide a targeted and measured response to a particular social problem.  The 
Commission was also eager to highlight that its duty would be prospective.  This would, it 
argued, avoid allegations of crushing liability, allowing institutions to plan for the future and 
to mould their work practices accordingly.120  Its recommendation was for the enactment of a 
statutory non-delegable duty to be imposed on institutions which provide residential, school or 
                                                          
114 Armes (n 66), para.50. See also Baroness Hale in Woodland [2013] UKSC 66, para.33.   
115 J.G. Fleming, The Law of Torts (9th ed.,Thomson Reuters, 1998) 434. 
116 G. Williams, “Liability for Independent Contractors” (1956) 14 C.L.J. 180, 186 
117 J. Morgan, “Liability for Independent Contractors in Contract and Tort: Duties to Ensure that Care is Taken” 
(2015) 74 C.L.J. 109, 120. Cf state legislation such as the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s.5Q which treats non-
delegable duties as equivalent to vicarious liability 
118 See C. Beuermann, “Conferred authority strict liability and institutional child sexual abuse” (2015) 37 Syd L 
Rev 113. 
119 S. Deakin, “Organisational torts: Vicarious liability versus non-delegable duty” (2018) 77 C.L.J. 15, 18. 
120 2015 Report (n 9) 55. 
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day care facilities for children and on any religious organisation (or any other facility operated 
for profit) that provides services for children that involve the care, supervision or control of 
children for a period of time.121   This would impose liability towards children harmed by both 
the deliberate criminal acts and negligent misconduct of its members and employees.  In 
choosing selected institutions, the common connecting factor appears to be that these 
institutions represent places where children are at high risk of abuse.  
 
The duty would not, however, extend to not-for-profit institutions and foster and kinship care.  
In relation to the former, the Commission did not wish to discourage volunteers from offering 
opportunities for children to engage in cultural, social and sporting activities.122 The 
Commission took the view that in relation to foster and kinship arrangements, the degree of 
supervision or control needed to justify a non-delegable duty was absent.123  Its second 
recommendation, however, was that regardless of any non-delegable duty, the onus of proof 
should be reversed in relation to institutions where children are abused by their members or 
employees.  This would apply to a wider category of institutions, including foster and kinship 
arrangements: “this change will help to encourage higher standards of governance and risk 
mitigation in institutions that provide foster care and kinship care”.124  It suggested that it would 
be easier for community-based voluntary institutions to rebut the presumption than a 
commercial institution.  An institution would be personally liable for institutional child sexual 
abuse by persons associated with the institution unless the institution proves it took reasonable 
steps to prevent the abuse.125   
 
The aim therefore is to place the liability of institutions for abuse on a clear statutory basis.  In 
the Commission’s view, the HCA decision in Prince Alfred (discussed above) did not resolve 
difficulties arising from the status of the abuser (confined to employees) nor provide a 
straightforward test for courts to apply (the occasion test being dependent on consideration of 
the circumstances of the abuse and the precise role allocated to the abuser where evidence due 
to passage of time might be unavailable).126 There was a need, therefore, for a more generous 
test which would not depend on proof that the institution was negligent, but would extend to 
deliberate criminal acts of persons associated with the institution. 
 
The response to the recommendations in the 2015 Report has been revealing.  In contrast to the 
willingness, discussed in Section IIIA, to introduce legislation to amend limitation periods, to 
date only Victoria has legislated in this field.  In 2017,127 it introduced legislation under which 
organisations that exercise care, supervision or authority over children would be required to 
take reasonable precautions to prevent child abuse and, if abuse occurred, there would be a 
presumption that the organisation failed in its duty of care unless it can prove that reasonable 
precautions were taken to prevent the abuse. Noticeably, however, this legislation did not 
                                                          
121 Ibid., Recommendations 89-93. 
122 Ibid., 491. 
123 Ibid., 493.  Contrast the views in Armes (n 66) discussed above in relation to vicarious liability. 
124 2015 Report (n 9) 493-494. 
125 Recommendations 91-92.  Persons associated with the institution would include the institution’s officers, office 
holders, employees, agents, volunteers and contractors. 
126 Royal Commission, Final Report: Beyond the Royal Commission, Vol 17 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2017) 
26-27. 
127 See Wrongs Amendment (Organisational Child Abuse) Act 2017, inserting ss.88-93 into the Wrongs Act 1958 
(Vic). The Victorian government has stated, however, that its measures were influenced not only by the Royal 
Commission but also by the State’s own inquiry - Family and Community Development Committee, Betrayal of 




extend to the statutory non-delegable duty.  Commentators have questioned whether a reversed 
onus of proof, on its own, will offer sufficient support to victims of sexual abuse in the light of 
the evidential difficulties highlighted earlier in this paper in the context of fault-based claims.128  
This seems to leave much to the courts to determine just how easily institutions can rely on 
measures of good practice to rebut the presumption of liability.  The Royal Commission in its 
2017 Report noted that while the Queensland and New South Wales governments had released 
issues/consultation papers including the possibility of a non-delegable duty, other states and 
territories had yet to act.129 
Such hesitation does suggest that the option of a statutory non-delegable duty is not one a 
legislator takes lightly.  Statutory change requires the political will to adopt the recommended 
measures (and the costs to state-run institutions which go with them).  As noted above, to date, 
state and territory legislators across Australia have been less than keen to adopt this option.  
Should the legislators act, there appears at present to be a distinct possibility of an 
“implementation gap”  whereby measures will vary from state to state, leaving victims to the 
happenstance of where the tort is deemed to take place.130  There are, however, more profound 
difficulties raised by the statutory non-delegable duty option.   Legislation will only provide 
greater clarity and guidance for both plaintiffs and defendant if its scope is clearly defined.   
Tofaris, for example, has remarked that “[a] crucial issue in cases of non‐delegable duty is to 
identify with precision the duty whose performance is purportedly delegated.”131  
Commentators have been critical of the lack of exactitude in defining the statutory non-
delegable duty and whether its scope would be acceptable to the public.  For example, the 
Commission states that liability would extend to persons associated with the institution, 
including officers, office holders, employees, agents, volunteers, and priests.132  This term is 
vague and potentially very broad.  Just how “associated” must the abuser be to the institution 
for liability to arise?  The potential for litigation on this point is self-evident.  It might also be 
argued that the decision not to include not-for-profit institutions and foster and kinship care 
within the duty would hard to defend to the public given that Royal Commission CEO Philip 
Reed noted himself that, following over 4,000 private sessions conducted by Commissioners 
with survivors of child sexual abuse, “Over 40 per cent of individuals who attended private 
sessions said they were sexually abused as a child in out-of-home care, such as in former 
children’s homes and in foster care”.133  Excluding organisations such as the Scouts despite the 
Royal Commission raising concerns about the ability of organisations such as Scouts Australia 
to prevent and report child sexual abuse in a report published in 2014 highlights the difficulty 
of determining where to draw the line.134  Such questions also indicate the political delicacy of 
                                                          
128 Much will depend on how strong the presumption in favour of liability will be in practice.  The Commission 
merely comments that the steps that are reasonable for an institution will vary depending upon the nature of the 
institution and the role of the perpetrator in the institution: 2015 Report (n 9) 494. See A. Silink and P. Stewart, 
“Tort law reform to improve access to compensation for survivors of institutional child sexual abuse” (2016) 39 
U.N.S.W.L.J. 553. 
129 (n 126) at 28-29. 
130 See W. Budiselik, F. Crawford and D. Chung, “The Australian Royal Commission into Institutional Reponses 
to Child Sexual Abuse: Dreaming of Child Safe Organisations?” (2014) 3 Soc Sci 565-583. The Federal system 
in Australia means that it is for state and territory governments to decide whether they wish to implement the 
Commission’s recommendations.   
131 S. Tofaris, “Vicarious liability and non-delegable duty for child abuse in foster care: A step too far?” (2016) 
79 M.L.R. 871, 890 (emphasis added).  
132 2015 Report (n 9) 56. Consider, for example, the attempt in s.90 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) to define an individual 
“associated” with a relevant organisation. 
133 Submissions published on institutional responses to child sexual abuse in out-of-home care: July 18 2016. Cf 
the position in the UK and New Zealand: Armes [2017] UKSC 60, S v Attorney-General [2003] 3 N.Z.L.R. 450. 
134 Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Report of Case Study No. 
1 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2014), pp. 1–57. We could also raise questions of interpretation: for example, 
18 
 
determining the scope of such a duty and the reluctance of legislators to engage with difficult 
and controversial demarcation issues. Finally, there is the question how the statutory non-
delegable duty will relate to the common law.  As the Commission acknowledged, the law after 
Prince Alfred College is in a state of development.  How should the common law respond to 
statutory intervention – revert to its earlier more limited doctrine of vicarious liability or evolve 
alongside statutory developments?  Competing legal frameworks will be confusing for 
litigants, particularly with the possibility of different statutory formulations being adopted in 
states and territories across Australia. At the very least, there is a need for statutory intervention 
to complement, not contradict, the common law. 
 
(ii) Extending common law non-delegable duties to intentional torts. 
 
If the statutory non-delegable duty proves difficult, then, in terms of definition, scope and 
political will, can we argue that it lies to the courts to offer an alternative framework?  The 
groundwork exists – the modern Woodland/Kondis non-delegable duty, albeit presently 
confined to negligent misconduct.  While Australia continues to hold firm against this 
development, in Armes, the UK Supreme Court did not exclude the possibility that, in principle, 
there could be a non-delegable duty protecting against intentional harm to children in care.135 
On the facts, the Court held that the wording of the statutory framework rendered the imposition 
of a non-delegable duty on a local authority providing fostering services “too broad and … the 
responsibility with which it fixes local authorities is too demanding”.136  However, obiter, Lord 
Reed clearly expressed a view put forward earlier by Stevens – if a non-delegable duty can 
arise to protect against negligent mistreatment of the victim, can it be right that it does not 
extend to deliberate mistreatment of the same individual?  Stevens is typically more forthright: 
“Liability for the breach of a [non-delegable] duty cannot be avoided by showing that the 
breach as gross … If the duty assumed is a duty that care will be taken, this is breached where 
the child is abused … [L]iability for deliberate abuse follows a fortiori from liability for want 
of care.”137  While this may be contested doctrinally – does negligence encompass deliberate 
misconduct?138 – the policy argument is clear: if the non-delegable duty is there to protect the 
vulnerable, how can intentional harm be excluded morally from such a duty? Deakin goes 
further and argues that, while vicarious liability might seem more familiar to lawyers, it is the 
non-delegable duty which provides the most convincing form of enterprise liability.139 Tofaris 
also argues that Armes should have been a non-delegable duty case140 and draws on a body of 
literature that indicates that non‐delegable duties provide a more appropriate basis of liability 
in child abuse cases.141 
 
                                                          
would the Boys’ Brigade (a Christian foundation) be included as a religious organisation or excluded as not-for-
profit organisation?   
135 Armes (n 66), paras.50-51 (majority).  See also Lord Hughes who dissented on the issue of vicarious liability 
but not that of non-delegable duties, para.75. 
136 Armes (n 66), para.49. Cf K.L.B. v British Columbia [2003] SCC 51; [2003] 2 SCR 403 (which did also 
conclude that the case for extending vicarious liability to the relationship between governments and foster parents 
had not been established). 
137 Stevens (n 107) 361.  See also Torts and Rights (OUP, 2007) pp.122-123.   
138 The classic starting point for this much debated topic is Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 Q.B. 232.  Markesinis and 
Deakin, for example, argue that the functions of negligence and trespass torts differ fundamentally in practice:  S. 
Deakin et al, Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law (7th ed., Clarendon Press, 2013) 360. For differences between 
Australia and England and Wales, see P. Handford, “Intentional negligence: A contradiction in terms” (2011) 32 
Syd L Rev 29. 
139 (n 74) 7. 
140 Tofaris (n 131). 
141 See D. Tan, “For Judges Rush in Where Angels Fear to Tread” (2013) 21 T.L.J. 43; Beuermann (n 118). 
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Such arguments have force, so the real question is why the English courts have favoured (as in 
Armes) reliance on vicarious liability rather than non-delegable duties. If, as the authors above 
suggest, the non-delegable duty provides a purer enterprise risk response and is more focussed 
on the particular context in which the protective duty arises, why has it yet to be adopted in the 
UK?   
 
A number of reasons may be identified.  First, the non-delegable duty remains, as indicated 
above, conceptually problematic.  At the very least, pre-Woodland (2013), it was not regarded 
by the courts as providing a conceptual tool upon which the courts could confidently rely.  
Hence, for the majority of the House of Lords in Lister (2001),142 the logical response to the 
plight of the child abuse victims was to rely on the well-known concept of vicarious liability.  
Even post-Woodland, the courts are still testing the boundaries of the assumption of 
responsibility non-delegable duty,143 in particular, the relationships to which it applies.  On this 
basis, abuse in a hospital or care home might be deemed to fit easily into this category, but 
other institutional cases, such as abuse by soccer coaches, scout masters etc. are far from clear 
and remain to be resolved by the courts. It is a doctrine then which remains in need of 
clarification and is in the process of legal development.   
 
Secondly, it is of note that commentators such as Stevens and Beuermann who argue in favour 
of primary liability see it as an alternative replacing vicarious liability, and offering a more 
controlled and certain legal framework.  Certainly, with hindsight, we can argue that Lister 
might have been better interpreted as a non-delegable duty case, confined to the particular 
context of institutional carers abusing the very children they were employed to look after.144  
The problem is that the UK courts at present seem to be treating the possibility of a non-
delegable duty not as an alternative replacing vicarious liability, but as an additional basis for 
liability.  In other words, as Morgan states, a means by which they can extend vicarious liability 
to independent contractors.  In opting, then, in 2001 for vicarious liability in lieu of non-
delegable duties, the courts’ choice in CCWS, Cox, Mohamud and Armes has been one of 
extending, not constraining, the doctrine.  As a result of recent cases such as Barclays Bank 
Plc v Various Claimants,145 in which a bank was held vicariously liable for the sexual assaults 
of a doctor in private practice offering medical examinations for its job applicants and 
employees, there is increasingly little need for the UK courts to “add on” non-delegable duties 
and make the effort needed to resolve the conceptual difficulties associated with them.  The 
non-delegable duty is treated as a fall-back if the vicarious liability argument fails.  The 
problem is that vicarious liability very rarely fails … 
 
We can conclude therefore that, at present, the common law non-delegable duty is simply not 
strong enough conceptually to match the force of vicarious liability.  While academics can 
make a strong case for reform, without conceptual certainty and the need to engage in the real 
effort required to construct a controlled legal framework, it seems likely that vicarious liability 
will continue to be seen by the courts as the “go to” doctrine to deal with claims of historical 
                                                          
142 Arguably Lord Hobhouse’s judgment may be seen as supporting non-delegable duty analysis: [2001] UKHL 
22, paras 54‐55. 
143 See, for example, Razumas v MoJ (n 111). For uncertainties which remain post-Woodland, see R. George, 
“Non-delegable duties of care in tort” (2014) 130 L.Q.R. 534; P. Giliker, “Vicarious liability, non-delegable duties 
and teachers: can you outsource liability for lessons?” (2015) 31 P.N. 259. 
144 See N.J. McBride and R. Bagshaw, Tort Law (5th ed., Longman, 2015) 899; T. Weir, An Introduction to Tort 
Law (2nd ed., Clarendon Press, 2006) 112-113.   
145 [2018] EWCA Civ 1670. Irwin L.J, at para.46, further questions whether, in the light of the later decisions of 
Cox and Mohamud, Woodland could now have been argued on the basis of vicarious liability.  
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child sexual abuse.  In the next section, I will examine the impact of this finding for the general 




IV. IMPACT ON TORT LAW GENERALLY 
 
Vicarious liability continues, therefore, to be on the move.146 The statutory/common law non-
delegable duty for intentional torts, while advocated by the Royal Commission and certain 
commentators, has yet to be accepted in the UK or Australia.  While vicarious liability has 
proved to be able to respond to the needs of victims of historic child sexual abuse, albeit more 
flexibly in the UK than in Australia, such developments have had a knock-on effect on tort law 
generally.  In contrast to the Woodland/Kondis non-delegable duty which is premised on an 
institutional defendant assuming responsibility for the care and welfare of a particular set of 
victims,147  the UK test for vicarious liability is applicable to a broad category of relationships 
(prison authorities/prisoner in Cox; local authority/foster parents in Armes), within a wide field 
of activities (racist abuse and attacks in Mohamud) and covers both negligence and intentional 
torts (Cox/Mohamud).  Lord Reed in Cox made it clear that the modern theory of vicarious 
liability stated in CCWS is not confined to some special category of cases, such as the sexual 
abuse of children, but intended to provide a basis for identifying the circumstances in which 
vicarious liability may in principle be imposed.148  The criteria set out in CCWS for vicarious 
liability are therefore as readily applicable to a negligent driver as to a person deliberately 
attacking a co-worker or customer.  In refusing to distinguish sexual abuse cases from other 
claims in tort, the UK courts have established as a matter of precedent that a broad doctrine of 
vicarious liability, primarily based on notions of enterprise risk, is applicable across the law of 
torts. 
 
Inevitably this has led to concerns of over-extensive liability being placed on defendants who 
are not at fault bar being connected in some way to a tortfeasor “integrated” into their 
organisation whose torts are “within the field of activities” allocated to him or her.  The recent 
case of Barclays Bank where the bank was found vicariously liable for a doctor in private 
practice operating from his own consulting rooms has confirmed concern that “the wall around 
vicarious liability for independent contractors has been breached”.149  While other cases have 
sought to interpret the CCWS test more narrowly,150 a broad notion of vicarious liability now 
operates across the English law of torts, with consequences in terms of loss distribution, 
insurance and, post-Armes, serious concerns as to its impact on local authority funding.  We 
can also observe that the decisions of the Supreme Court have not diminished litigation in this 
field.  Quite the opposite.  A number of cases are currently on appeal raising once again the 
operation of the two-stage test.  A future Supreme Court case on this topic (the fifth since 2012) 
is increasingly likely. 
 
                                                          
146 To use the well-known phrase of Lord Phillips in CCWS (n 62), para 19. See also Lord Reed in Cox (n 65), 
para.1. 
147 See Lord Sumption in Woodland v Essex CC [2013] UKSC 66, para.23 who sets out the defining features of 
the Woodland non-delegable duty  
148 Cox (n 65), para. 29. 
149 A. Silink, “Vicarious liability of a bank for the acts of a contracted doctor” (2018) 34 P.N. 46, 46.  
150 See, for example, Kafagi v JBW Group Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 1157; Bellman v Northampton Recruitment Ltd 
[2016] EWHC 3104 (QB), [2017] I.C.R. 543 (on appeal); but not all: Various Claimants v Wm Morrisons 
Supermarket Plc  [2017] EWHC 3113 (QB), [2018] I.R.L.R. 200. 
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The issue of vicarious liability and unincorporated associations provides a good illustration of 
the concerns raised in this paper.  One problem facing victims of child sexual abuse cases is 
that the perpetrators may be working for an organisation which is not incorporated e.g. a 
church, charity, voluntary or sporting organisation.  In Australia, the courts have maintained as 
a matter of strict law that the rules applicable to suing unincorporated associations must 
continue to be applied. This means that the plaintiff will have to show that the trustee 
corporation possessed a sufficient community of interest in the matter to maintain an action 
against it.151  The contrast with the position in the UK is remarkable.  When the issue was raised 
in the UK Supreme Court in CCWS, the Court simply dismissed it out of hand: 
 
Because of the manner in which the institute carried on its affairs it is appropriate to approach this case as if the 
institute were a corporate body existing to perform the function of providing a Christian education to boys, able 
to own property and, in fact, possessing substantial assets.152 
 
McIvor has argued that the most important contribution of CCWS to the law is its confirmation 
that unincorporated associations can be subject to vicarious liability, which she describes as 
“an entirely sensible development”.153  The fact remains, however, that a solution provided 
(with little or no conceptual analysis) to deal with a hurdle facing victims of child sexual abuse 
now operates across the law of torts.  Without, it should be added, any consideration of its 
broader impact in terms of loss distribution, insurance premiums and so on.   
 
The question is how we react to this.  The broad test for vicarious liability, as developed in the 
UK, would seem lack definitional certainty, is expanding from case to case and lacks a clear 
theoretical underpinning.  The Australian reluctance to follow this path is understandable, 
particularly as Deakin rightly observes, the law in its current form seems to represent 
“something of a historical accident” rather than a considered and coherent form of legal 
development.154  Such a view is shared by many UK academics, who fear that, far from seeking 
a close connection, Mohamud suggests that vicarious liability may arise simply because the 
employment provides an opportunity for the commission of the wrongful act.155  We may also 
contrast the willingness of English tort law to embrace enterprise risk for vicarious liability 
with its reluctance to permit claims against public bodies such as the police for negligent 
investigations.156 If vicarious liability is regarded as an exception to corrective (fault-based) 
liability, how can we accept its ongoing extension to cover claims for which even 10 years ago 
no court would have considered its imposition? 
 
The Australian response has been to put on the brakes.  It is perhaps inevitable that this has led 
to an overly cautious approach.  In particular, retaining a narrow interpretation of “employee” 
                                                          
151 See Trustees of Roman Catholic Church v Ellis (2007) 70 NSWLR 565, [2007] NSWCA 117.  See also Ireland: 
Hickey v McGowan [2017] IESC 6, para 52. The Royal Commission has recommended that state and territory 
governments should introduce legislation to provide that, where a survivor wishes to commence proceedings for 
damages in respect of institutional child sexual abuse where the institution is alleged to be an institution with 
which a property trust is associated, then unless the institution nominates a proper defendant to sue that has 
sufficient assets to meet any liability arising from the proceedings: (a) the property trust is a proper defendant to 
the litigation, and (b) any liability of the institution with which the property trust is associated that arises from the 
proceedings can be met from the assets of the trust: Recommendation 94.  So far only Victoria has legislated (in 
a slightly different form).   
152 CCWS (n 62), para.33. 
153 C. McIvor, “Vicarious liability and child abuse” (2013) 29 P.N. 62, 63. 
154 Deakin (n 74) 9. 
155 e.g. P. Morgan, “Certainty in vicarious liability: a quest for a chimaera?” (2016) 75 C.L.J. 202. 
156 See Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] A.C. 1732; CN v Poole BC  
[2017] EWCA Civ 2185; [2018] 2 W.L.R. 1693. 
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is misguided in that it fails to respond to the casualisation of modern working relationships.157 
Nowadays the motorcycle courier in Hollis v Vabu158 would be far more likely to be working 
as casual labour than under a contract of employment. Recognising the impact of the gig 
economy is not a sign of weakness, but one of progress.  Nevertheless, the High Court’s 
decision to favour a test of “occasion” does indicate a genuine attempt to adopt a controlled, 
incremental approach to the growth of vicarious liability.  While we can argue whether, in 
practice, this test will prove sufficiently robust to provide a framework for the course of 
employment test, 159 it marks a clear refusal to follow the path of the UK courts and one which, 
if applied in a clear and structured way, can grow into a test providing guidance for the lower 
courts.   
 
It is submitted that such an incremental approach provides the most sensible means by which 
greater clarity can be brought to UK law.  It needs, however, to be applied to both stages of the 
vicarious liability test.  On this basis, when applying the stage two “close connection” test to 
intentional torts, the court should move towards adoption of a more controlled test.  It is 
submitted that the Australian “occasion” test does provide a way forward, albeit one which will 
require some elaboration by the courts.  In focussing on the role given to the employee and the 
nature of his responsibilities, the court examines the relationship uniting the parties, 
particularly whether the tortfeasor had been placed in a position where he or she had authority, 
power, trust, control and the ability to achieve intimacy with the victim.  This can be easily 
translated into the language of risk: vicarious liability should only be imposed if the tortfeasor’s 
role and the nature of his responsibilities give rise to a heightened degree of risk.  By such 
means, the courts have guidance to frame the operation of the doctrine, enabling them to move 
towards a more structured and coherent framework for vicarious liability.  One immediate 
consequence would be the need to reflect further on the decision taken in Mohamud: can we 
really say that a kiosk attendant in a petrol station with a duty to interact with customers has 
such authority, power or control over the customer to give rise to vicarious liability? If not, 
Mohamud is a step too far. 
 
The incremental approach also suggests a more cautious approach is needed to the stage one 
relationship test.  While it does not prevent the courts imposing vicarious liability on a prison 
for the misconduct of prisoners working in its kitchen, it stresses that such relationships must 
be genuinely “akin to employment” and not simply loosely linked to the enterprise.  Cox is 
correct, on this basis, but I would question whether Armes (finding the relationship of foster 
carer/local authority akin to employment) is a step too far.  This leads to a more radical 
conclusion.  If, as certain commentators have indicated above, the local authority/foster carer 
relationship is not naturally “akin to employment”, then rather than denying liability, a case 
can be made to consider whether the Woodland non-delegable duty should be extended to this 
scenario.  This requires caution.  The move from negligence to intentional torts is not to be 
taken lightly and the statutory framework in question needs to be considered carefully. The 
latter, it will be recalled, was considered by the Supreme Court to bar this option in Armes.  
Nevertheless, an incremental approach to vicarious liability requires the court to recognise that 
vicarious liability has its limits.  On this basis, if the “akin to employment” tests fails, the 
answer is not to further extend the stage one relationship, but look to different options and see 
                                                          
157 See H. Collins, “Independent Contractors and the Challenge of Vertical Disintegration to Employment 
Protection Laws” (1990) 10 O.J.L.S. 353; J. Prassl, The Concept of the Employer (OUP, 2015). 
158 [2001] HCA 44, (2001) 207 C.L.R. 21. 
159 Some Australian commentators have been positive. Crawford, for one, has argued that it provides greater 
certainty than had previously existed in Australia (or indeed is found in the UK and Canada):  H. Crawford, “A 
step in the right direction?” (2017) 24 T.L.J. 179. 
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whether, exceptionally, the Woodland non-delegable duty should extend to this case.  By such 
means, the law would promote consistency and, it is submitted, diminish the threat of over-
extensive liability with defendants acting as guarantors against the possibility of tortious harm.  
I would argue, therefore, that reining in vicarious liability with cautious development of the 
Woodland exception will provide the UK courts with the opportunity to provide greater 
certainty in the law and more predictability for the lower courts.  It would, however, require 
the courts to recognise that Mohamud and Armes need to be reconsidered as illegitimate 




Emerging from four Supreme Court judgments between 2012-2017, UK vicarious liability law 
is still operating in a state of uncertainty.  Recent case-law continues to test its boundaries.  
There is a lack of clarity in the current law.  The law has been shaped by the global scandal of 
child sexual abuse as highlighted in the reports of the Australian Royal Commission and IICSA.  
Difficulties in bringing claims in private law against abusers or for institutional fault has led 
the courts and reform bodies to consider two options: vicarious liability and non-delegable 
duties.  In particular, the Australian 2015 Redress and Civil Litigation Report recommended 
the introduction of a statutory non-delegable duty to assist plaintiffs in bringing their claims.  
As this paper has indicated, the statutory non-delegable duty has not been adopted and we can 
identify concerns as to its cost, scope and interpretation.  The common law non-delegable duty, 
revived in the UK in Woodland in 2013 based on Australian authority, has received some 
academic support as a means of dealing with abuse cases, but, as seen, it remains unclear 
whether the Woodland duty will apply to intentional harm and there are unresolved questions 
of conceptual clarity.  Notably if the non-delegable duty is treated simply as a means of 
supplementing vicarious liability, it is likely to offer little bar further complicating the existing 
law. UK and Australian tort law, to date, have thus opted to develop vicarious liability rather 
than non-delegable duties to assist victims of child sexual abuse.  In the UK, in particular, the 
two stage test adopted in CCWS permits a flexible approach both to the relationships which 
give rise to vicarious liability and the “field of activities” covered by the doctrine.  Australia, 
while continuing to require a contract of employment, has, in Prince Alfred College, responded 
to the need to adjust vicarious liability to meet social concerns and it is hoped that it will only 
be a matter of time before the High Court reconsiders the “employment” requirement.   
 
My paper has highlighted, however, difficulties arising from the broad doctrine of vicarious 
liability in UK law and contrasted it with the controlled extension of vicarious liability in 
Australia.  It argues that the time has come to reflect on the current state of English tort law.  
Recent Supreme Court decisions have led to questionable extensions of both stages of the 
vicarious liability test and, it is submitted, a more considered approach would ask whether 
Mohamud and Armes should legitimately be treated as vicarious liability cases.  The paper 
recommends, therefore, adoption of an incremental approach at both stages of the UK vicarious 
liability test.  A case is also made for an exceptional non-delegable duty based on the Woodland 
framework which could be applied in relation to intentional torts, although it would need to be 
analysed carefully, notably in relation to the statutory framework within which the institution 
operates, and would require the court to address fundamental concerns as to the conceptual 
coherence of such duties. 
 
We often turn to comparative law to learn from other jurisdictions and gain inspiration, 
particularly in relation to systems sharing a common legal tradition and facing similar social 
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problems.160  Prince Alfred College offers a way forward.  The High Court advised on the need 
for an approach which has “ the advantage of being likely to identify factors which point toward 
liability and by that means provide explanation and guidance for future litigation.”161  In 2001 
in Lister, the House of Lords sought inspiration from Canada.162  It is time for the UK Supreme 
Court to look to the High Court of Australia.  In a nutshell, vicarious liability should no longer 
be on the move.  It should stop.  And reflect. 
 
 
                                                          
160 K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd ed., Clarendon Press, 1998) 223. 
161 See (n 87), para.46. 
162 Bazley v Curry [1999] 2 SCR 534.   
